The commercial airline industry of the United States has undergone tremendous changes since it was deregulated in 1978. Allowed to operate in a more open and competitive environment, airline management reacted quickly (and sometimes ingeniously) to maintain and expand their market share.
The results over the past 15 years have been disastrous for all but a few airlines.
Many of the airlines' initiatives and innovations produced results that were totally unforeseen by the government. This paper discusses how airline deregulation has produced today's industry structure and shows how our lawmakers failed to correctly predict results of their actions. The reason for the CAB change was simple. The industry had grown too large for the CAB to micromanage without increasing the size of its bureaucracy beyond acceptable limits. In short, the CAB had achieved its 1938 goal of promoting the airline industry.
Regulation reached into almost every facet of the industry.
Entry and exit restrictions were the most obvious controls which stymied competition on one hand yet ensured that quality service was extended to small communities as well as to large city-pairs. The people favoring deregulation believed that no government involvement was necessary to assure a competitive environment since there would be no barriers to entry in a free market industry.
In effect, they were saying that with entry into and exit from the industry being relatively easy and inexpensive, the market is highly contestable. They believed that should a monopolistic carrier charge higher than competitive prices and provide lower than competitive service, the threat of new entrants would soon force the established carrier to produce optimal service at a competitive price.
The benefits of deregulation were expected to be found through increased competition, leading to improved quality of services available to the public. It was assumed that carriers would profit as the price elasticity of the passenger market would ensure increased utilization of capacity, and empty seats would be filled.15
While the move to deregulate the transportation industry had gained momentum, the final impetus to reform the airline industry regulations was the General Accounting Office (GAO) release of it. 3port on the airline industry on February 23, 1977.
In his message to Congress requesting regulatory reform, President
Carter cited this report which concluded that regulation of domestic airlines had kept air travel costs up. The report went on to say that: (due to regulation)
-air fares were between 22 and 52% higher than they would otherwise be.
-between 1969 and 1974, airlines could have operated at a lower cost, saving travelers between 1.4 billion and 1.8 billion dollars annually.
-travelers' savings could have been even higher since lower fares would encourage greater travel. ' 6 In his Message to Congress, President Carter specifically requested six objectives in regulatory reform:
(1) To the maximum extent possible, the domestic commercial airline industry should be governed by competitive market forces not governed by the decisions of a government bureaucracy.
(2) Ease the restrictions which prevent entry into the industry and into protected routes -so that new, innovative companies can offer their services to the public.
(3) Allow carriers to expand their routes, within limits, without approval from the CAB.
(4) Free carriers to set competitive prices (regulated only to prevent predatory -below costs pricing).
(5) Give carriers more flexibility to leave markets.
(6) Protect small communities against loss of needed air service.
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In retrospect, it seems that the government intended to deregulate the industry regardless of any testimony or evidence against deregulation.
Those that predicted in their testimony that all would not be smooth were branded "nay-sayers," and perhaps their overstatement of expected chaos lessened their believability.
In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Aviation,
in April, 1977, Mr. John Robson, Chairman of the CAB, expressed the common arguments offered by opponents to deregulation to be "abandoned service, capital starvation, possible carrier failure, employee hardship, excessive industry concentration, and destruction of the U.S. air industry."'' 8 It was his opinion (and that of other CAB officials and Congressmen) that the "empirical evidence" supports the conclusion that excellent, attractively priced, safe air transportation, which is profitable to the carrier, can be provided without tightly protective economic regulations.
Politicians and political economists were so convinced -and they controlled the future. Industry leaders were not convinced, but they were not listened to.
C. Industry'Concerns Over Deregulation
During the Senate Deregulation hearings in 1977, practically all of the airlines were opposed to general deregulation.
Industry labor organizations argued that cutthroat competition would ensue, reducing wages and benefits and cost many workers their jobs.1 9 Worried about job security, airline employees lobbied Congress unsuccessfully for financial assurances in the event deregulation caused massive layoffs.
Even though some carriers (Frontier, Air West, Pan Am and later United) anticipated opportunities that might open with deregulation, the vast majority were opposed to deregulation.
They argued that it would lead to chaos, drive many out of business and create less competition. 20
Robert Crandall, later to become president of American Airlines, believed that deregulation needlessly risked degradation of service, safety, and the integrated air transport network. 2 ' And in what has become a highly prophetic assessment of deregulation, Frank Lorenzo, the chairman of Texas
International, stated that if deregulation of the airlines goes into effect, "we will, over a period of years, end up with a couple of very large airlines. There will be many small airlines that will start up here and there, but they will never amount to a very significant amount...The operating and financial advantage will go to the large carriers with substantial resources, and to very small carriers that temporarily have lower labor costs, primarily because they are non-unionized."
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It appears now that organized labor and industry executives more accurately predicted the consequences of deregulation than did those government advocates who prevailed at the time.
D. The Airline DereQulation Act of 1978.
The Airline Deregulation Act passed by Congress in 1978 reduced the economic regulation of commercial passenger service. Using these so-called yield management systems, the airlines were quick to take advantage of the elasticity in the market, maximizing profits on non-discretionary (business) travellers and filling discounted seats with discretionary (pleasure) travellers.
Further, computerized reservation systems enable airlines to more easily identify those non-profitable routes which can then be subsidized by excess profits from less competitive markets.
This is a practice fully accepted under economic regulation and carried over today.
With such a dominance in computerized reservation system, percent of all domestic tickets (up from 50 percent prior to deregulation), they appear to be working first for a select few airlines, followed by passengers a distant second. 48 What Did the Government Know or Do?
Barriers to entry were intended to be few -an airline must only show it is capable of providing the public service.
Competitive barriers were expected to be no greater than in other U.S. industries.
The unexpected ingenuity of the airlines to thwart competition, again, was not foreseen. Improving computer technologies have also helped create a competitive edge for the major carriers. states a respected airline consultant, "they begin to move in concert." 52 These three, predict many analysts, will be the controlling airlines in the domestic market for years to come. Economies of scope are advantages obtained from the size and structure of the market served (city-pairs and type of passenger markets) where a wider variety of services are provided using fewer resources.
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